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Abstract 
This paper explains why different studies present widely-varying estimates of the effect 
of increased schooling on national income.  It shows that when correctly-interpreted, 
these studies support the hypothesis that a one-year increase in average schooling 
attainment raises national income directly by about 10% and indirectly by about 19%.  
The increases in national income are larger than the aggregate effect of higher 
workers’ salaries, because schooling has external effects on national income.  Due to 
the rising cost of additional years of schooling, the national return on investment in 
schooling is much lower in more-educated countries.  The estimated real national 
return on investment in schooling in 2005 ranged from over 40% in the least educated 
countries to 8.5% in the most educated countries. Average levels of schooling and 
average test scores at ages 9 to 15 generally rise together, so either measure of human 
capital can explain differences in national income or growth rates across countries. 
Since the productivity of physical capital depends on the level of human capital, in a 
global financial market, the growth in human capital largely determines the growth in 
physical capital and in national income.   
 
 
Key Words: Schooling; Human Capital; Test Scores; Economic Growth 
JEL Codes: O41; I25 
 
*
Universidad EAFIT, Carrera 49#7 Sur-50, avenida Las Vegas, Medellin, Colombia 
 
ted.breton@gmail.com and tbreton@eafit.edu.co 
  
In several recent articles Eric Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann [2008, 2012a, 
and 2012b] present statistical results showing that differences in students’ scores on 
international tests of science and mathematics explain three times the variation in 
GDP/capita growth rates explained by differences in adults’ average schooling 
attainment.   They also show that when the effect of average test scores and average 
attainment are examined together, differences in test scores explain most of the 
variation in growth rates and differences in schooling do not explain any of this 
variation.  They conclude that more schooling does not reliably raise students’ cognitive 
skills and that increases in cognitive skills at ages 9 to 15, not increases in schooling, 
cause economic growth [Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008].   
But other studies of the effect of schooling on national income come to 
completely different conclusions.  Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
[2013] examine the relationship between average income/adult and average schooling 
attainment in 1569 world regions that account for 97 percent of world GDP.  They find 
that differences in schooling can explain 58 percent of the differences in income/capita 
across these regions, far more than any other single factor.  When they estimate the 
effect of multiple factors on income, they find that the level of schooling is by far the 
most important factor.  Each additional year of schooling is associated with a 26% 
increase in income/capita.   
This enormous inconsistency in the estimated effect of increased schooling on 
national income across studies is not a new phenomenon.  Krueger and Lindahl [2001] 
investigated the causes of this inconsistency in their comprehensive review of the earlier 
empirical literature.  They found that the estimated effect of schooling depends on the 
structure of the income model used in each analysis.  They showed that the estimates are 
very different if the physical capital stock is included or excluded from the model, or if 
the effect of changes in schooling are examined prior to or during the growth period.  
They also found that the estimated effect of schooling is minimal if it is examined using 
poorly-measured schooling data over short periods, or if the mathematical relationship 
between the measures of income and schooling is not correctly specified.   
The more recent literature continues to provide widely-varying estimates of the 
effect of additional schooling on national income.  But I show in this article that these 
differences actually are consistent because they are entirely explained by differences in 
the structure of the growth model used to estimate the effect of schooling in the 
different studies.  As a consequence, there is now strong evidence that increases in 
schooling are a reliable strategy for raising national income, even though some studies, 
such as Hanushek and Woessmann [2008], reach a different conclusion.     
This article reviews the recent literature on the effect of increases in schooling 
on national income.       
 Section I explains the two prominent models of the effect of schooling on 
growth, compares the results from the two models, and shows that the 
empirical evidence now clearly supports one over the other. 
 Section II explains the mechanisms through which increases in schooling 
raise national income in the best-supported model. 
 Section III presents the results from the literature on the magnitude of the 
various effects of schooling on national income.   
 Section IV examines the relationship between a country’s average level 
of schooling and its level of cognitive skills, as measured by international 
test scores, and explains why increases in either measure can explain 
economic growth.   
 Section V examines whether the share of national investment expended 
in post-secondary schooling affects national income.  
 Section VI explains why in a global financial market a country’s level of 
human capital/adult determines its level of physical capital/adult and its 
national income/adult. 
 Section VII summarizes what we have learned.  
I. Exogenous and Endogenous Growth Models   
Economists agree that increases in a nation’s level of capital, both physical 
capital (e.g., machinery) and human capital (i.e., acquired skills), cause economic 
growth, but until recently they have not agreed on the dynamics of this process or on the 
magnitude of the effects of increased human capital on growth.  Analysis at the micro 
level (i.e., at the level of the firm) clearly indicates that an increase in the level of capital 
raises output.  If an individual attends school and raises her level of human capital 
through the schooling process, she generally can obtain a higher salary in the work 
place.  Studies of why this occurs provide pretty strong evidence that more educated 
workers are paid higher salaries because they are more productive on the job.  Similarly, 
if a factory owner invests in additional physical capital that improves the factory’s 
productive capacity, the factory becomes more productive. 
The physical connection between capital and output is not observable for the 
economy as a whole, but logically the aggregate increases in physical capital and human 
capital at the micro level raise the nation’s stocks of these two kinds of capital, which in 
the aggregate raises the economy’s productive capacity.  If there is sufficient demand to 
make use of this additional capacity, then national output should rise.   
Economists have defined the macro relationship between increased capital and 
increased output over a period as “exogenous” growth.  The process is denoted 
“exogenous” because the increases in capital that raise national output occur outside the 
growth model.  The model simply quantifies the relationship between the increases in 
capital (when they occur) and the resulting increases in output.   
Although increases in capital over time are the mechanism most likely to raise 
national income, the level of capital also could affect the economy’s growth rate.  It is 
possible that with a certain level of physical and human capital, national output might 
increase over time without further increases in the amount of capital, and this increase 
might be greater in countries that started with a higher level of capital.  Economists have 
designated this process “endogenous” growth because the economy itself increases 
output by raising the productivity of its existing capital over time.  Implicitly the work 
force uses its existing ingenuity to increase the productivity of the installed capital, and 
this productivity increases more in countries that begin the time period with more 
human capital.   
Figure 1 illustrates how growth in output occurs in the exogenous and 
endogenous growth models for an illustrative time period, 1960-2000.  When the effect 
of increased schooling on national income is estimated in these two models, the results 
measure the magnitude of different relationships.  In the exogenous growth model, they 
estimate how an increase in capital over a period (in this case 1960-2000) raises 
national income over this same period.  In the endogenous growth model, they estimate 
how an increase in capital at the beginning of the period (in this case 1960) raises the 
amount of growth in output that occurs over the subsequent time period (in this case 
1960-2000). 
 Figure 1 
Growth in Exogenous and Endogenous Growth Models
  
Since historically national levels of physical and human capital have increased 
relatively steadily across countries, it is difficult to identify whether the observed 
growth in national income has been due to “exogenous” or “endogenous” growth, or to 
both types simultaneously.  Researchers have attempted to determine which type of 
growth has occurred using statistical models, but they have not always correctly 
interpreted their results.     
Breton [2011] points out that the endogenous growth model has an inherent 
inconsistency, which is so serious that the model is conceptually flawed.  Since the 
model only considers the effect on growth of changes in the level of capital at the 
beginning of the period, it implicitly assumes that any increases in capital that occur 
later, even very soon thereafter, have no effect on growth during the period.  In the 
illustration in Figure 1, which corresponds to Hanushek and Woessmann’s analysis, the 
growth period is 40 years.  Logically it makes no sense that an increase in capital in 
Exogenous 
Growth Model
Endogenous 
Growth Model
Increases in K and H Cause Growth
Levels of K and H at the Beginning 
of the Period (1960) Cause Growth
K-1960 + H-1960
∆K + ∆H ∆Y
1960 2000
∆Y
1960 increases growth over 1960-2000, but that an additional increase in capital in 1965 
has no effect on growth over this period.   Yet this is what the model assumes.  The 
structure of the endogenous growth model could be modified so that increases in capital 
after 1960 also affect growth, but then the growth in the endogenous model would no 
longer be entirely endogenous.   
Importantly, if either of these growth models is not a valid model of how growth 
actually occurs, then when that model is estimated statistically, its results will show that 
an increase in schooling does not cause much, or any growth.  This is why two studies, 
one estimating effects in the exogenous growth model and one estimating effects in the 
endogenous growth model, can reach entirely different conclusions about whether 
additional schooling causes growth.  A study finding no effect from an increase in 
schooling has implicitly rejected the type of growth model used in the analysis, but it 
has not shown that an increase in schooling in the other type of model has no effect.   
Researchers are not always clear about which growth model they have specified, 
and they almost never explain their results as confirmation or rejection of a specific 
growth model.  As a result, they may misinterpret their findings and draw invalid 
conclusions about the implications of their findings for educational policy.       
As examination of the two studies described earlier reveals that Hanushek and 
Woessmann and Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer did not estimate 
the same growth model.  Gennaioli, et. al. estimated the effect of additional schooling 
across countries in the same year, which is an application of the exogenous growth 
model.  So a correct characterization of their results is that they found that an increase in 
schooling across regions is highly correlated with an increase in national income.
1
    
Hanushek and Woessmann estimated the effects of increased schooling in 1960 
and of higher test scores over the 1960-2000 period on growth over this period, which is 
a mix of endogenous and exogenous components [Breton, 2011].  As a result, their 
estimates are difficult to interpret, but implicitly what they found is that an increase in 
initial schooling in the endogenous growth model has no effect on national income, and 
instead growth is explained entirely by the increase in test scores in the exogenous 
growth model.
2
   
So Hanushek and Woessmann’s and Gennaioli, et. al.’s results are consistent.  
Both sets of researchers found that an increase in schooling or in test scores during a 
period substantially increased national income over that period, as specified in the 
exogenous growth model.  But in addition, Hanushek and Woessmann found that the 
endogenous growth model does not explain growth over this same period.  So they 
found no support for the model that seems to have a conceptual flaw.  Unfortunately, 
Hanushek and Woessmann drew the wrong conclusions from their results.  They 
concluded that increases in schooling do not cause growth, when what they actually 
found is that the endogenous growth model does not explain growth.   
Breton [2011] notes the inconsistent treatment of increases in schooling and 
increases in test scores in Hanushek and Woessmann’s growth model, and he concludes 
that their results cannot be used to determine whether increases in schooling or in test 
scores have a larger effect.  He then examines the effect of both increased schooling and 
                                                          
1
  Conceptually, a cross-sectional comparison is equivalent to looking at the effect of raising schooling in 
a single country over a very long period of time.  
2
 Hanushek and Woessmann’s model includes the variables from the dynamic form of the exogenous 
growth model, which are the flow of human capital during the growth period and the initial level of 
GDP/capita [Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992]. 
higher test scores in the same exogenous growth model, and he finds that either an 
increase in schooling or an increase in test scores raises national income and that the 
variation in national income explained by the two measures are relatively similar.  So he 
also finds that increases in human capital have a large effect in the exogenous growth 
model.     
Hanushek and Woessmann’s [2008, 2012a, and 2012b] finding that increases in 
the initial levels of schooling (and physical capital), i.e., the effects examined in 
endogenous growth models, do not increase national income is consistent with the 
results from other studies.  Sunde and Vischer [2011] carry out an extensive analysis to 
determine whether increases in schooling raise national income in either model over the 
1970-2000 period.  They find that estimates of the effect of changes in schooling and in 
initial schooling are both statistically significant, but the effect of changes in schooling 
(the exogenous model) is large and the effect of changes in initial schooling (the 
endogenous model) is very small (about 1/20
th
 of the effect of changes in schooling).   
Other empirical studies also provide consistent results.  Cohen and Soto [2007] 
and Breton [2013a] estimate exogenous growth models, and they both present evidence 
that increases in physical capital and in schooling attainment raise national income in 
this model.  Jones [1995] and Liu [2005] test the consistency of historic changes in 
physical and human capital with the predictions of the endogenous growth model, and 
both studies reject the validity of this model.   
II. The Dynamics of the Exogenous Growth Model   
Given that the existing empirical evidence strongly and consistently supports the 
validity of the exogenous growth model, it is useful to examine the model’s dynamics in 
detail.  The standard exogenous, or neoclassical, model in the empirical literature is the 
Solow growth model, augmented with human capital.  It behaves much like the basic 
Solow growth model, but with some additional complexity.  An important feature of 
this model is that it exhibits diminishing returns to investment in capital.  Increases in 
physical or human capital, or both together, raise national income, but at a decreasing 
rate as capital/worker rises.     
In a modern economy human capital is created primarily in schools, so the 
nation’s cumulative investment in the schooling of the adult population, net of financial 
depreciation, is a measure of a country’s stock of human capital.  Figure 2 shows the 
estimated relationship between the marginal product of human capital and the stock of 
human capital/adult for 60 countries in 2005 [Breton, 2013c].  The marginal product 
measures how much national output increases when human capital increases 
(∆GDP/∆H).  The pattern in the figure shows the large effect of incremental human 
capital on national income in countries with little human capital/adult and the 
diminishing effect that accompanies increases in human capital/adult.  National output 
is equal to national income, so the marginal product of human capital relationship in 
Figure 2 also shows how national income increases as human capital/worker increases.   
Importantly, this increase in national income does not accrue entirely to the 
worker who raises his human capital by obtaining additional schooling.  As will be 
discussed later, some of this increased national income accrues to other factors of 
production in the economy due to the external, or spill-over, effect of the more educated 
workers on the productivity of the other factors of production.  The spill-over effects of 
human capital and physical capital on worker productivity explain why workers earn 
more in countries with higher levels of capital/worker.  When a worker migrates from a 
low-capital country to a high-capital country, she earns more because the larger spill-
over (or external) effects of the greater human and physical capital/worker in the high-
capital country raise her productivity.   
 
Figure 2 
Marginal Product of Human Capital Across Countries in 2005 
 
Source: Breton [2013c] 
 
Since the two types of capital are complementary, an increase in either type 
raises the productivity of the other type.  As an example, an increase in the capability of 
workers using computers makes the computers more productive.  Similarly, an increase 
in the number of computers makes skilled workers more productive.   As a consequence 
of this complementary relationship, countries have a lot or a little of both kinds of 
capital, because neither kind alone is very productive.  The relationship between the 
stocks of these two kinds of capital is shown in Figure 3 for 2005.  Japan has more 
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physical capital than human capital, and the U.S. has more human capital than physical 
capital, but both countries have considerable amounts of both types.  Sub-Saharan 
African countries have very little of either type.  
 
Figure 3 
Stocks of Physical Capital and Human Capital Across Countries in 2005 
 
Source: Breton [2013c] 
 
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the economic growth process in the augmented 
Solow model when the level of schooling increases [Breton, 2013a].  An increase in 
schooling increases the nation’s human capital, which then raises output both directly 
(the solid line) and via two indirect effects on the productivity of physical capital and 
(unschooled) labor, the other two factors of production (the dotted lines).  The figure 
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also shows a third indirect effect (labeled “4”) common in most countries today: the 
positive effect that rising income has on the society’s demand for schooling.   
 
Figure 4 
Effect of Schooling on National Production and Income 
 
 
The augmented Solow model simulates the physical investment process that 
follows an increase in the level of schooling.  This investment does not occur 
immediately because an increase in schooling does not affect the economy until the 
schooled individuals enter the work force.  The delay is longer with investment in 
primary schooling than with investment in secondary or post-secondary schooling.  As a 
consequence, the poorest countries must wait the longest for investment in schooling to 
pay off, but eventually it yields a very high return, higher than the return in more 
educated countries.        
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The eventual increase in the human capital of the work force raises the marginal 
productivity of physical capital, which raises its expected return on investment.  Private 
investors then increase their investment in physical capital, which has a direct effect on 
output and an indirect effect on the productivity of human capital and (unschooled) 
labor.  As these various productivity effects work their way through the economy, 
economic output rises, and national income increases along with it.        
Technological progress also increases the productivity of the three factors of 
production, which raises the return on investment in physical capital.  Breton [2013b] 
estimates that on average world technological progress raised world total factor 
productivity by 0.3% per year during the twentieth century, so its cumulative effect is 
large over long periods of time, but quite small in the short term.   
In the augmented Solow model, increases in human capital, labor, and world 
technological progress all make physical capital more productive.  If none of these 
factors increase, incremental investment in physical capital is not financially viable.  An 
increase in any of them causes growth, but in a market economy only the increase in 
human capital is under the direct control of the government through its support for 
schooling.    
Human capital and physical capital are identical mathematically in the 
augmented Solow model.  But the market dynamics of investment in these two types of 
capital are very different.  In a market economy private investment responds 
immediately and automatically to an increase in the productivity of physical capital.  In 
contrast, the private investment response to an increase in the productivity of human 
capital is much more limited. 
In highly educated countries the dynamics of investment in human capital has 
some similarities to investment in physical capital.  Many individuals have financial 
assets they can use to collateralize school loans, and high-level education is often of 
short duration, so it provides some financial return relatively quickly.  As a 
consequence, educated individuals respond to rising financial returns for human capital 
by raising their investment in post-secondary schooling.   
But in poor countries with low average levels of schooling, the dynamics of 
investment in human capital is completely different.  Most of the population is poor and 
has no assets.  Investment in schooling must begin at the primary level in children.  The  
risk of the investment is high because there is no financial return for many years.  Poor 
countries find themselves in a “low-education trap.”  Most individuals have no skills 
and no capability to finance acquisition of these skills.  Cordoba and Ripoll [2013] 
present evidence that in poor countries the high fertility rates in poor families make it 
impossible for them to pay the costs of private schooling for their children.   
Even in a country with a market economy and institutions capable of protecting 
private property, the financial capital market cannot solve the country’s low human 
capital problem.  The financial risk associated with long-term, uncollateralized loans to 
individuals with no financial assets is simply too high.  Ben Mimoun [2008] shows that 
the high income inequality combined with underdeveloped financial markets in sub-
Saharan and Latin American countries explain between 30 and 50 percent of the 
difference in school enrollment between these countries and those in the OECD.    
Due to the credit constraints, investment in schooling in poor countries is rarely 
market-determined.  Instead, the decision to invest is largely an “exogenous” decision 
made by charities, religious groups, or more commonly the state to provide schooling to 
the poor [Easterlin, 1981].  Historically these decisions were made first in northern 
Europe and its colonies, later in southern Europe and Japan, and only relatively recently 
in Asia, Africa, and most of South America [Benavot and Riddle, 1988, and Morrisson 
and Murtin, 2009].   
The countries that historically provided the most charitable or public support for 
elementary schooling are the most educated today.   And due to the complementary 
effect of human capital on the productivity of physical capital, the most-educated 
countries also have the highest levels of physical capital/adult.  Some of these countries, 
like the U.S., developed slowly over a long period of time, and others, like Japan and 
Korea, developed later in a more accelerated fashion.  Nevertheless, their development 
processes were similar in that the state provided considerable support for education, and 
the private sector then responded to the rising labor productivity by investing heavily in 
physical capital [Breton, 2013c]. 
As mentioned earlier, in the augmented Solow growth model, investment in 
physical capital is subject to diminishing returns.  What this means is that the return on 
investment falls as physical capital/worker increases.  But the complementary nature of 
the two kinds of capital means that the return on physical capital rises if the investment 
in human capital rises.  As a consequence, continuing investment in physical capital 
(e.g., in factories) is attractive primarily if a continually rising stock of human capital 
offsets the diminishing return that accompanies the growing stock of physical capital.  
This is why those countries that have grown steadily for a long time have a history of 
continually raising their level of schooling.   
Figure 5 shows the growth in the average level of schooling and national 
income/capita in the U.S. from 1870 to 2010.  Growth in income/capita has closely 
tracked growth in the average level of schooling attainment, except in periods of 
economic crisis (not shown).  
 
Figure 5 
Average Schooling and Income/capita in the U.S. 1870-2000 
 
Sources: Morrisson and Murtin [2009], Maddison [2003], and Feenstra, Inklaar, and 
Timmer [2013]  
 
III. The Quantitative Effects of More Schooling on National Income 
Now that we understand the direct and external, or spill-over, effects of 
increased schooling and the dynamics of the economic growth process, we can turn to 
the empirical literature quantifying the size of the various effects of schooling on 
growth.  There are two ways that these effects have been quantified; as a return on 
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investment in schooling and as the effect of an additional year of schooling on national 
income.   
Hanushek and Woessmann [2008] have argued that the return on investment in 
schooling is small and unreliable, but as we have seen, their conclusion is not based on 
estimates from the exogenous growth model.  So we need to look at other studies to 
obtain these estimates, and we need to confirm that these estimates are not biased 
because they have not controlled adequately for the reverse effect that rising national 
income has on investment in schooling.   
Breton [2013a] presents estimates of the marginal product of schooling on 
national income in 1990, as well as estimates of the market return on investment in 
schooling through the associated salary increases in 36 countries around 1990.   Using 
the quantitative relationships in Breton’s various studies, Figure 5 shows the estimated 
market and total national return on investment in schooling for the range of human 
capital/adult that existed across countries in 2005.  The national estimates in Figure 5 
are calculated from the marginal product of human capital in Figure 2, which holds 
constant the stocks of physical capital and labor.  The marginal product would be higher 
if the stock of physical capital were not held constant.   
These estimates indicate that the national real rate of return on investment (i.e., 
net of inflation) in the least-educated countries, such as Pakistan, was over 40%, while 
in the most-educated countries it was only 8.5%.   These estimates also indicate that the 
market real rate of return was about 17% in the least-educated countries and 7.5% in the 
most-educated countries.  The difference between the national and the market rates is 
the external or indirect “spill-over” effect of schooling on national income, which is 
very large in the least educated countries, but almost disappears in the most educated 
countries.  
 
Figure 5 
Marginal Real Rate of Return on Investment in Schooling in 2005 
 
Source: Calculated from Breton [2013a, 2013b, and 2013c] 
 
An analysis of the relative size of the components of the marginal product 
reveals that in the most educated countries, the total effect of schooling on national 
income is about 10% larger than the direct effect on workers’ salaries.  In countries with 
average human capital of about $20,000/adult, e.g., Colombia, the total effect of 
schooling is about 70% larger than the direct effect.  In countries with very little human 
capital, such as Pakistan, the total effect of schooling on national income is more than 
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twice the direct effect.  The implication is that increases in schooling have huge effects 
on national income in the least-educated countries, but the magnitude of this effect is 
not widely appreciated because over half of it does not accrue to the individuals 
receiving the schooling. 
Another way to measure the effect of schooling on national income is to estimate 
how an incremental year of average schooling attainment affects national income per 
adult across countries.  These estimates are available from a number of recent cross-
country studies.  In these estimates researchers assume that an incremental year of 
schooling raises national income by the same percentage, regardless of the initial 
average level of schooling. They make this assumption because this log-linear 
(Mincerian) relationship between income and years of schooling provides a good fit 
with the national income data [Breton, 2013a].   
Table 1 presents the implied estimates of the effect of an additional year of 
schooling on income/adult or on income/capita from recent articles in peer-reviewed 
journals.  The table presents two sets of estimates.  The first set is the partial effect of 
additional schooling, holding constant the level of physical capital/worker in the 
economy.  As mentioned earlier, increases in schooling make physical capital more 
productive, encouraging additional investment in physical capital.  The first set of 
estimates does not include this indirect effect of additional schooling on national 
income.  The second set of estimates, denoted “full effect,” includes the direct effect of 
schooling on national income and the indirect effect associated with the related increase 
in physical capital. 
  Table 1 shows two types of statistical estimates, one estimated with ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and the other with two-stage least squares (2SLS).  OLS measures 
the correlation between schooling and national income, but it does not distinguish 
whether this correlation is due to the effect of schooling on national income, or the 
reverse effect of national income on schooling (labeled “4” in Figure 4).  The 2SLS 
technique attempts to eliminate the reverse effect of national income on schooling from 
the correlation, so it is likely to provide a more accurate estimate of the true effect of 
more schooling on national income.   
 
Table 1 
Effect of an Incremental Year of Schooling on National Income/Adult 
 
Partial Effect Full Effect 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Cohen & Soto 2007 
 
8% 
  Gennaioli, et. al. 2013 
  
22%* 
 Breton 2013a 13% 11% 
  Breton 2013b 17% 10% 27% 19% 
     Likely Effect 
 
10% 
 
19% 
*Adjusted down from 26% to account for differences in estimated years of schooling. 
 
The number of available estimates of the effect of additional schooling on 
national income is limited, but their consistent magnitudes are reassuring.  These 
estimates indicate that an additional year of schooling initially raises national income by 
about 10 percent, but that after the external effect of more human capital on physical 
capital productivity has resulted in more physical capital investment, the total increase 
in national income is 19%, or almost twice as much.   
As mentioned earlier, Gennaioli, et. al. found that each additional year of 
schooling is associated with a 26% increase in regional income. Since they did not 
control for differences in physical capital across regions, their estimate measures the full 
effect of additional schooling on national income.  Their estimate is not directly 
comparable to the other estimates because their measure of average schooling 
attainment only includes years related to completion of a degree.  Since their average 
schooling level is 16% lower than Cohen and Soto’s estimate, a comparable estimate of 
the full effect of an additional year of schooling on income in their study is 22%.  This 
estimate is still likely to be too high because it does not control for the reverse effect of 
higher regional income on investment in schooling.   
Breton [2013b] finds that across 42 countries in 2000 an additional year of 
schooling is associated with a 27% increase in national income, but after controlling for 
the reverse effect, an additional year of schooling only raises national income by 19%.  
His results indicate that OLS estimates of the effect of schooling on national income 
include a substantial upward bias.  Accordingly, Breton’s lower 2SLS estimate of 19% 
is likely to be a more accurate estimate of the full effect of schooling than Gennaioli, et. 
al.’s adjusted estimate of 22%.   
The assumption that each additional year of schooling raises national income by 
the same percentage appears to conflict with the diminishing returns to investment 
shown in Figures 2 and 5.  But it turns out that the effect of an additional year of 
schooling on national income is constant across levels of schooling because each 
additional year of schooling attainment has a higher unit cost.     
Figure 6 shows the relationship between human capital/adult per year of 
schooling adjusted for purchasing power parity (i.e., cumulative investment net of 
depreciation) and average years of schooling across countries in 2005.
 3
  The data show 
that some countries with the same average schooling attainment have invested 
                                                          
3
 The stock/adult is estimated from cumulative investment in schooling less depreciation in each country 
over the period 1960-2000.  Documentation for the calculations is provided in Breton [2010 and 2013a].  
Years of schooling in 2005 are the mean of the average schooling attainment of the population 15 to 64 in 
2000 and 2010 estimated by Cohen and Soto [2007].  
considerably more in each year of schooling.  For example, Portugal and Syria both had 
about 7.5 years of average schooling attainment, but Portugal had invested about six 
times as much per year of schooling.  The data also show that there is a strong tendency 
for countries to spend more per year of schooling as they raise the average level of 
schooling.  On average the most educated countries spend six times as much per year of 
schooling as the least educated countries.   
 
Figure 6 
Human Capital/Adult per Year of Schooling vs. Average Schooling in 2005 
 
   
Average investment per year of schooling rises with higher average attainment, 
in part because higher levels of schooling have higher unit costs than lower levels.  But 
in addition, as average schooling levels rise, countries become wealthier and spend 
more on the lower levels of schooling.  In this process as a country’s average years of 
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schooling rise, the investment per year of schooling, and potentially the average quality 
of a year of schooling, also rises. 
As the average level of schooling rises, the decline in the return on investment 
and the increase in the cost of an additional year of schooling approximately offset, 
leaving an approximately constant effect (10%) of an incremental year of schooling on 
national income.  Again the seemingly inconsistent estimates of the effect of schooling 
on national income in different studies are actually consistent.  
IV. The Quantity vs. the Quality of Schooling 
Hanushek and Woessmann argue that the low average test scores in most poor 
countries on international tests shows that educational policy has not focused on raising 
cognitive skills.  They argue that existing educational policy is misdirected because it 
focuses on extending schooling coverage, rather than on raising skills, and their 
statistical results show that higher test scores, rather than more schooling, increase 
economic growth [Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008]. 
But as mentioned earlier, Hanushek and Woessmann’s results showing that more 
schooling does not increase growth are related to the endogenous growth model, which 
has little empirical support.  In addition, their comparison of the effect of average test 
scores and average schooling uses data that implicitly measure human capital/adult in 
periods 50 years apart.  They compare the effect of adults’ schooling in 1960 and 
student test scores obtained between 1964 and 2003, or mostly after 1990 for 
developing countries.  Breton [2011] observes that the average test score for students 
age 9 to 15 between 1964 and 2003 is implicitly the average score for the adult work 
force in about 2010.   
So a valid comparison of Hanushek and Woessmann’s average test scores and 
adult’s average schooling attainment would use attainment in 2010, not 1960.  Figure 7 
shows how their average test scores relate to average (adult) schooling attainment in 
2005.  The two measures are highly correlated across countries, except for South Africa 
and Peru, which are outliers with very low scores.  In the data an increase in average 
schooling attainment from 7 to 11 years is associated with an increase in average test 
scores of about 100 points, or about 25 points per year of additional schooling.   
 
Figure 7 
Average Test Scores vs. Average Schooling of the Adult Population in 2005 
 
 
Breton [2011] examines the relationship between average test scores and average 
schooling attainment and national income across countries in 2000 and finds that either 
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measure explains the variation in national income, although schooling differences 
explain slightly more of the variation.  So Hanushek and Woessmann’s [2008, 2012a, 
and 2012b] findings that higher test scores cause growth and more schooling does not is 
rejected.  Instead both measures are proxies for a nation’s human capital and either can 
explain income differences.   
It is not obvious why these two measures of human capital are so highly 
correlated, since they measure different aspects of a country’s human capital.  Average 
test scores measure students’ skills in science and math at ages 9 to 15, while average 
schooling attainment measures how long the average student stayed in school.  
The various relationships presented in this paper and elsewhere provide a 
possible explanation for the correlation between these two measures.  The estimates in 
Table 1 show that national income rises 10% with each additional year of average 
schooling in the adult population.  Figure 6 shows that as countries raise their average 
schooling attainment, they invest more in their schools.  The increased investment in 
schools corresponds to better training and higher salaries for teachers, or to smaller 
classes, both of which tend to occur as countries become wealthier.  Lee and Barro 
[2001] have shown that as countries invest more in schools, students’ skills, as 
measured by test scores, improve.  So the likely relationship between the two measures 
is from more years of schooling to more income/capita to more investment in schools to 
higher test scores at ages 9 to 15.   
Hanushek and Woessmann [2008] recommend that educational policy in poor 
countries be redirected from providing more years of schooling to raising student test 
scores, because more schooling does not reliably raise income/capita.   But as we have 
already shown, their claim that more schooling does not raise income/capita is based on 
an invalid analysis.   
Even if the goal is to increase students’ cognitive skills related to science and 
mathematics, there are two ways to do this.  One way is to increase students’ skills at 
ages 9 to 15.  But the other way is to keep students in school longer.  Fuchs and 
Woessmann [2006], Juerges and Schneider [2004], and Woessmann [2003] present 
evidence that in European countries students’ scores on the same international tests 
increase 32 points (compared to a mean of 500) after one additional year of schooling.  
These results indicate that keeping students in school longer, i.e., raising average 
schooling attainment, is a viable strategy for raising their cognitive skills. 
If either higher test scores at ages 9 to 15 or more schooling raise national 
income, then a policy focused on raising average schooling attainment is a more reliable 
growth strategy.  Hanushek and Woessmann [2008] report that policy initiatives 
focused on raising student test scores often fail.  So Hanushek and Woessmann’s 
argument against a strategy focused on higher schooling attainment is reversed.  Raising 
average schooling attainment is a more reliable strategy for raising income/capita than 
trying to raise test scores at ages 9 to 15.   
V. More Elementary or More Post-Secondary Schooling? 
In poor countries average schooling attainment can be increased by increasing 
the share of the school age population in elementary school or by increasing the number 
of students in post-secondary schooling.  Governments in these countries must decide 
where to invest their limited funds available for the expansion of schooling.   
Breton [2013c] examines whether the share of post-secondary schooling affects 
national income in 2005, holding constant total investment/adult in schooling. He finds 
that this share has no effect, indicating that it is the total investment in schooling that 
drives economic growth, not the relative shares of this investment allocated to 
elementary or post-secondary schooling.  The implication of these results seems to be 
that governments can allocate available funding for schooling in any way they wish, 
without worrying about how this distribution affects the rate of economic growth.  But it 
seems that this interpretation of these results is incorrect.    
Ben Mimoun [2008] finds that the allocation of public funds to different levels 
of schooling affects the total national (public and private) investment in schooling.  He 
finds that total enrollment at the secondary and post-secondary school levels are lower if 
governments allocate more of their limited funds to post-secondary schooling.  This 
result apparently occurs for two reasons.  First, reduced funding at the primary and 
secondary level reduces the quality of this schooling, which has an adverse effect on 
student decisions to continue in school.  Second, due to the credit-constraints on the 
private financing of primary and secondary schooling, lower funding at the primary and 
secondary levels reduces the enrollment of poor students at these levels, which then 
leads to lower total enrollment at the post-secondary level.  As a consequence, higher 
allocation of limited government funds to the primary and secondary levels of schooling 
raises the overall national (public and private) investment in schooling, which then 
raises national income.    
VI. The Central Role of Human Capital in the Growth Process 
After World War II the Bank of Reconstruction and Development was created to 
spur economic growth in rich and poor countries.  At the time economists thought that 
increases in physical capital determine economic growth.  Theodore Schultz [1961] 
observed that Europeans rapidly and efficiently made use of enormous quantities of 
financial capital to rebuild their countries, while the small quantities of financial capital 
provided to poor countries often were poorly utilized.  He argued that human capital is 
required to manage physical capital and that human capital is the type of capital most 
likely to be in short supply.   
In a global capitalist economy, financial capital flows to those countries that 
have attractive opportunities for investment in physical capital.  As a consequence, 
financial capital flows to any country with relatively high expected returns until the 
expected return declines to the level that characterizes other countries.  As a 
consequence, the marginal product of physical capital is similar across the globe.  
Caselli and Feyrer [2007] estimate this marginal product across rich and poor countries 
in 1996 and confirm that the returns for reproducible capital (i.e., excluding exploitation 
of natural resources) are similar everywhere.   
In a global market a country that seeks foreign investment must take actions to 
raise the marginal product of capital.  One common approach is to provide investors 
with tax-free, enterprise zones.  These zones provide higher after-tax returns by 
eliminating the tax.  But the exogenous growth model suggests that a better way to raise 
the productivity of physical capital is raise human capital/adult.  This policy makes 
physical capital more productive without giving away the country’s tax revenues.    
Since the return on physical capital rises in countries that are raising the level of 
human capital, global financial capital flows to these countries.  Unless a country has 
natural resources to extract, financial capital does not flow to countries where levels of 
human capital are not rising.  Instead the limited financial capital in these countries 
flows out, looking for a more attractive return elsewhere.   
The implication is that in a global financial capital market, income growth will 
be determined by the growth in human capital, since only in those countries will 
investments be made in both human capital and physical capital.  Breton [2013b] has 
examined whether increases in human capital/adult, as measured by average schooling 
attainment, explain the growth in GDP/capita in 42 countries between 1910 and 2000, 
two years that followed periods of high global mobility of financial capital.  He shows 
that increased schooling and world productivity growth explain 82% of the growth in 
GDP/capita over this period, after controlling for reverse causality.   
Most of this growth was caused directly or indirectly by the increase in the 
average level of schooling, which was quite large in every country.  Average 
GDP/capita increased by 1.9%/year, of which 0.3% was due to TFP growth, while 1.6% 
was due to capital accumulation [Breton, 2013b].  But since much of the investment in 
physical capital was due to the increase in its productivity related to rising human 
capital, the increase in schooling attainment was the principal driving force for the 
growth in these countries over this period.   
VII. Conclusions 
Empirical studies of the effect of increased schooling on national income have 
provided conflicting estimates for a long time.  But it is now evident that these estimates 
differ because the different studies quantify different effects of schooling. 
The principal difference recently has been that some studies examine the effect 
of changes in schooling on national income that occur during the growth period 
(denoted exogenous growth), while other studies examine the effect of changes in the 
initial level of schooling on national income during a subsequent period (denoted 
endogenous growth).   A review of these studies reveals that studies of exogenous 
growth consistently find a similar, very substantial effect, while studies of endogenous 
growth consistently find little or no effect.   
Breton’s [2013a] estimates of the exogenous growth model indicate that 
increases in schooling have a real return on investment (i.e., net of inflation) that varies 
from 8.5% in the most educated countries to over 40% in the least educated countries.  
The magnitude of this effect has not been evident in the least-educated countries 
because less than half of it accrues directly to the recipients of schooling.  The 
remaining effect is the external or spill-over effect of schooling that affects the economy 
by raising the productivity of physical capital and (unschooled) labor.    
Empirical studies using exogenous growth models estimate that an additional 
year of average schooling attainment raises national income by about 10% directly and 
by about 19% in total, if the indirect effect of greater schooling on investment in 
physical capital is included in the estimate.  The effect of an additional year of average 
schooling attainment on national income is constant across levels of average attainment, 
despite the diminishing returns to investment, because the unit cost of a year of 
schooling rises with the increase in average schooling attainment.     
The studies that have found that higher test scores raise growth, while more 
schooling does not, are invalid, since they inappropriately compare the estimated effect 
of more schooling in an endogenous growth model to the effect of test scores in an 
exogenous growth model.  When the effect of higher test scores and additional 
schooling are examined in a comparable manner in an exogenous growth model, both 
measures explain growth about equally well because average levels of schooling and 
average test scores are highly correlated across countries and rise together.    
Historic studies show that not only does raising average schooling attainment 
increase national income, this increase is required to make investment in physical 
capital financially viable.  Countries do not have high levels of physical capital/adult 
unless they also have high levels of human capital/adult.  As a consequence, in a global 
financial market, capital flows predominantly to countries that continually raise their 
average schooling attainment.  
Since credit constraints preclude private investment in the primary and 
secondary schooling of the poor, growth in the least-educated countries cannot proceed 
and has never proceeded unless charities or governments provide or subsidize the 
schooling of the poor.  Countries that are well-educated and have high incomes today 
have a long history of providing public schooling, or subsidized private schooling, to 
the poor.  
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